REALITY Conceptualization As it clarifies William Luijpen, ' ' all and any construction human being, either in science, either in the art, the philosophy or the religion, estimates or has as its starting point the Real. The act to question themselves on the direction of the life, from the reflexiva conscience, and to construct reality concepts (s) that it varies (m) position according to where if finds the citizen observing, are characteristic proper of the beings humanos' '. For W. Luijpen, the quarrel on the diversification of the realities and the variety of the worlds are associated with the one of the multiple truths, each one of these truths with its specific values in one determined context, not remaining degree or anteriority of one (scientific truth, for example) in relation ace others that are aesthetic or philosophical. W. Luijpen, Intr. to the existencial fenomenologia ' ' Reality, therefore, is an extremely complex concept, that deserves deepened philosophical reflections. After all, all construction human being, either in science, the art, the philosophy or the religion, works with the Real, or has in it its bedding or starting point (and of arrived).
Better saying she treats yourself, in last analysis, of if to question the direction of the life human being, life that, endowed with a reflexiva conscience, constructed its concepts of reality, from which if exerts in the world and if it multiplies, modifying to each moment the face of planeta.' ' Joo Francisco Duarte Jnior, Intr., 12 Joo Francisco Duarte Jnior defines types of Reality: 1.a Daily Reality that if all imposes we with its weight. It is the one that if can say reality par excellence, in which we move in them as fish in the water. It is based on intentions practical, that in last analysis, have to see with our survival. 2.a Scientific Reality is one ' ' reality of second ordem' ' : apia reality that if in that one where we day-by-day move in them in ours. The scientific constructions leave, inevitably, of our perception human being of the reality (daily reality).
The moral action is, therefore fulfilled, not in virtue of an end, but so only for the principle determines that it. It is ece of fish in movement for an interior inclination, that is the categorical imperative. Thus, the legislation that an action erects as to have, and the duty at the same time as impulse, are moral. That one, for the opposite, that does not understand this last condition in the law and, that consequentemente, it also admits a different impulse of the idea of the proper one to have, is legal. Therefore, it is to have external to keep the proper promises in compliance with a contract, for example, but the imperative to make it solely because it is to have, without taking in account any another impulse, only belongs to the internal legislation. We have, therefore, in compliance with the perspective adopted for Kant, who the distinction between morality and legality is purely formal, therefore says respect to the form to compel itself, and not to the object of the actions. Robert J. Shiller is likely to increase your knowledge. 2 the freedom concept the kantiana moral doctrine is established on the freedom, the one that if arrives for constriction of the causal world. The freedom is found in the practical reason, that is, in the will.
Therefore the will is the proper practical reason. This implies to affirm that the freedom can be explicitada from the will concept. In this bias, it designates Kant: The freedom concept is a pure rational concept and that for this exactly he is transcendente for the philosophy theoretician, that is, is a concept such that no example that corresponds it can be given in any possible experience, and whose object we cannot get any theoretical knowledge: the freedom concept cannot have validity as regulating of this e, in truth, mere negative. But in the practical use of the reason the freedom concept proves its reality through practical principles, that are laws of a causalidade of the pure reason for determination of the choice, independently of any empirical conditions (sensitivity in general) and disclose a pure will in us, in which moral concepts and laws has its source (MC, III.